Pikuach Nefesh: Are We Always Allowed to Save a Life? (Part 4)

 Would We Ever Need to Use Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas?

While it is possible that Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas is the main source for Pikuach Nefesh on Shabbos, and that V’Chai Bahem only came to teach us that Shabbos may be transgressed [because of this svara] even in the case of a safek, most of the Rishonim and poskim believe that in the maskana of the Gemara, V’Chai Bahem became the main source for the heter to override Shabbos for the sake of pikuach nefesh. As such, it would seem like we have little need for the concept of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas when it comes to practical halacha. [As it would appear that V’Chai Bahem does everything that Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas does, plus more.]

However, we need to address a very important question: is it possible for there to be a case where we would not be able to use the source of V’Chai Bahem? Because, if such a case where to exist, then the only Torah source we would be able to utilize to justify the violation of an aveirah for the sake of pikuach nefesh would be Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas.

We will now analyze several such cases where V’Chai Bahem would likely not apply, and as such, Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas would therefore be our sole halachic source for allowing us to engage in pikuach nefesh.

1) Saving a Fetus on Shabbos

We have already seen the fundamental debate regarding whether a fetus is considered to be a nefesh. While some Rishonim maintain that fetus is almost a full nefesh, others are of the opinion that a fetus is not yet a nefesh or only a partial nefesh. The entire concept of V’Chai Bahem is based on the premise that one who is alive should not need to give up their life for the sake of a mitzvah or aveirah. However, in order to use this svara, one would likely have to already be alive.

Thus, in the case of a fetus, an argument can be made that V’Chai Bahem might not apply, depending on how we view the status of a fetus in the eyes of halacha. The more we learn towards giving a fetus the status of a nefesh – even a partial nefesh – the more we would be able to utilize the source of V’Chai Bahem to save the life of a fetus on Shabbos. However, the more that a fetus is only a potential nefesh, but not yet a nefesh, the more we would be unable to use the source of V’Chai Bahem to save the life of a fetus on Shabbos.

Nevertheless, even if that were the case, it makes sense that we would still potentially be able to use the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas Kidei Lishmor Shabbasos Harbei, since by saving the life of the fetus, the fetus will (b'ezras Hashem) be able to keep many more Shabbasos in the future, once it is born.[1]

One of the most important Gemaras[2] for this discussion states as follows:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת ערכין דף ז עמוד א

א"ר נחמן אמר שמואל: האשה שישבה על המשבר ומתה בשבת, מביאין סכין ומקרעים את כריסה ומוציאין את הוול. פשיטא מאי עביד. מחתך בבשר הוא. אמר רבה לא נצרכה להביא סכין דרך רשות הרבים

Rav Nachman says that Shmuel says: In the case of a woman who sat on the birthing stool in the throes of labor, and died on Shabbos, one brings a knife, and tears open her abdomen, and removes the fetus, as it might still be alive, and it could be possible to save its life. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it obvious that this is permitted? After all, what is the person who cuts her abdomen doing? It is merely cutting flesh, and there is no reason why it should be prohibited.

Rabbah said: No, the halacha concerning cutting open her abdomen is necessary only to teach that it is permitted to bring a knife by way of the public thoroughfare for that purpose, despite the fact that this constitutes a prohibited labor by Torah law.

The Gemara teaches us that in a case where a pregnant woman dies on the birthing stool on Shabbos, we are allowed to push aside Shabbos in order to save the life of her unborn baby, even if it did not yet leave her womb. Why is this so? There are several possible explanations:

1. A fetus is already a nefesh:

If a fetus is already a nefesh, then we can use the principle of V’Chai Bahem and violate Shabbos in order to save the life of the fetus.

2. A fetus is not a nefesh, but since the mother died, the fetus now takes on an independent identity and gains its status as a nefesh:

Even if normally, while a fetus is in utero, we rule that a fetus is not a nefesh, this might only be due to its dependency on its mother for life; thus, in such a case, until the fetus is born, it would not be considered a full nefesh. However, in this case, the mother died on the birthing stool. As such, even though the fetus is still in the womb, since the mother has passed away, perhaps this is enough of a transition to now give the fetus an independent status as a nefesh. And even though this might not be enough of a transition when the fetus is not yet viable to survive independent of the mother, in this case, since the mother was on the birthing stool, we know that the fetus is developed enough to be an independent nefesh. Therefore, even though the fetus is still in the womb, it would gain the status of a nefesh, which would, in turn, allow us to push aside Shabbos to save its life through the source of V’Chai Bahem.

3. A fetus is not a nefesh, but we can Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas:

However, if the fetus is not a nefesh, and the mother's death does not change its status to a nefesh, then we would seem to be stuck. Since the fetus is not yet a nefesh, and we can't use V’Chai Bahem, how can we push aside Shabbos to save its life?

The Ramban[3] and the Ritva[4] therefore suggest that the Gemara is working on the premise that we can still use the principle of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas Kidei Lishmor Shabbasos Harbei: even though this fetus is not yet a nefesh, it will soon be a nefesh; and thus, we can push aside this Shabbos so that this newborn neshama will have the opportunity to keep many more Shabbasos in the future.[5]

Some of the Rishonim extend this svara to all cases where we would need to push aside Shabbos to save a fetus. The Ran[6], quoting the Behag, states that even in the beginning of pregnancy, we can push aside Shabbos to save the life of a fetus, because of the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas Kidei Lishmor Shabbasos Harbei.[7]

Saving Embryos in a Petri Dish

The question now becomes, what is the cutoff for using this svara? If the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas is based on the power of potential life, then at what point do we say that even though something is "potential life," it remains too much in the realm of potential that is does not yet qualify for the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas?

Take, for example, a case where a science lab catches fire on Shabbos, and in that lab are petri dishes full of embryos that were going to be implanted via IVF (in vitro fertilization) the following week. There are countless potential Shabbasos that could be kept if we were to push aside Shabbos to save these petri dishes. Thus, even if we were to argue that saving male reproductive seed and female eggs would not qualify for the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas, since they are pure potential, these embryos are much closer to becoming viable fetuses and could very likely become fully developed human beings. As such, there is definitely room to argue that the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas would still apply here, allowing us to push aside Shabbos to save these embryos.

However, since these embryos are less than 40 days old, we might not be able to use the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas, because one can argue that these embryos are still be in a category that leans too much towards the realm of "potential." Thus, even though we could make a distinction between saving an embryo and saving sperm and eggs that have not yet been joined, an embryo might still not have the same status as a fetus; and even when it comes to a fetus, some Rishonim limit the application of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas to a fetus that is at least 40 days old, as this is when the fetus attains its form. As such, if Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas only applies to a fetus that is at least 40 days old, it certainly would not apply to an embryo that is still in a petri dish.

2) Eliyahu Ha'Navi Performing Pikuach Nefesh on the Dead Body of the Ben Ha’Ishah Ha’Tzarfatis (The Son the Tzarfat Woman)

The Gemara in Bava Metzia[8] quotes a very interesting discussion about Eliyahu Ha'Navi. After stating that Eliyahu once met Rabbah in a cemetery, the Gemara asks the following question:

How can Eliyahu have entered the cemetery? After all, Eliyahu is a Kohen, and kohanim are not allowed to enter cemeteries?[9]

The Gemara answers by explaining that the cemetery had no Jewish bodies. [And, as many Rishonim (including the Rambam) explain, when it comes to the issue of Tumas Ohel, only Jewish bodies are metame (cause spiritual impurity).][10]

The lashon of the Gemara is as follows:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת בבא מציעא דף קיד עמוד א

אשכחיה רבה בר אבוה לאליהו דקאי בבית הקברות של נכרים….

אמר ליה: לאו כהן הוא מר, מאי טעמא קאי מר בבית הקברות? - אמר ליה: לא מתני מר טהרות? דתניא, רבי שמעון בן יוחי אומר: קבריהן של נכרים אין מטמאין.

Rabbah bar Avuh found Elijah standing in a graveyard of gentiles…

The amora proceeded to ask Elijah a question: Is not the Master a priest? As such, how can Elijah stand in a cemetery? Elijah said to him: Have you not studied the Mishnaic order of Teharos? As it is taught in a baraisa: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says that the graves of gentiles do not render one impure.

Tosafos[11] asks a fascinating follow up question: if Eliyahu was in fact a kohen, then how was he able to revive the Ben Ha’Ishah Ha’Tzarfatis, the son of the widow who passed away in Sefer Melachim?[12][13] In other words, since it is assur for a kohen to be exposed to tuma, if this child had passed away, how was Eliyahu allowed to expose himself to tuma for the sake of reviving him?

However, there is an obvious problem with Tosafos' question: after all, shouldn't the answer be obvious? For the sake of pikuach nefesh, we can violate almost any issur in the Torah; so of course Eliyahu should have been able to violate this issur for the sake of pikuach nefesh. Therefore, the real question is: why is this bothering Tosafos?!

Nevertheless, upon further analysis, Tosafos’ question becomes quite clear: the svara of V’Chai Bahem does not seem to apply to a dead person, as they are not alive; we cannot preserve their "life," as there is no life to preserve. Thus, Tosafos is actually asking a very powerful question: if we can't use the principle of V’Chai Bahem, then why was Eliyahu allowed to violate an aveirah in order to resuscitate this boy?

Possible Answers:

1. Eliyahu Knew with Certainty that He Would be Able to Save the Boy

Tosafos[14] provides an answer to his own question, suggesting as follows: Eliyahu knew that he would certainly be able to save the boy and bring him back to life, and thus, it was muttar because of pikuach nefesh.

And yet, this simply raises another question: how does "being sure" (barur/vadai) solve the problem?

There are two likely explanations:

1. Since Eliyahu was 100% certain that he would succeed, it could be considered – on a conceptual level – that the boy was still alive. Why? Perhaps death is defined as one who is irreversibly dead. Thus, because Eliyahu knew that this boy could be revived, the svara of V’Chai Bahem could still be used, and thus Eliyahu was allowed to violate an aveirah in order to save the boy's life.
2. Alternatively, it is possible that the svara of V’Chai Bahem could no longer be used, because the boy had indeed died. However, even so, the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas could still potentially apply. Nevertheless, as we have already seen, one potential limitation for using the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas is that it needs to be a "vadai" (certainty). And while we saw the possibility that V’Chai Bahem revealed[15] that Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas can even apply by a safek, this is not accepted by all the Rishonim.[16] Strikingly, this is exactly how the Netziv[17] explains the shitah of Tosafos: it was only because Eliyahu knew with certainty that he would be able to resuscitate the boy, that he was able to use the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas. It is also important to note that in this case, Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas is being applied in a completely universal sense. The mitzvah being pushed aside is not Shabbos, and it is not even clear that the only reason this is muttar is because the boy will be keeping more Shabbasos. While it is possible that Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas can only be applied here because the boy will keep more Shabbasos, it is also possible that according to the Netziv’s understanding of Tosafos, Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas can be used as a general svara, enabling us to push aside one aveirah for the sake of keeping many more mtizvos in the future.

2. There Was Actually No Issur of Tuma

In general, whenever we have a problem (or question), we can either:

• Accept the problem (or question) and find an answer
• Or, we can reject the actual problem (or question) itself, thus showing that there was no issue to begin with. 

The first answer we gave accepted the question and tried to find a solution to the problem of a kohen being exposed to tuma. The following, however, are several possible ways of getting out of the problem altogether by suggesting that there was no issur of tuma to begin with.

A) The Child was Not Jewish

Another possible solution to Tosafos' question is that the child was not Jewish. This is the opinion of the Radvaz[18] (quoting Rabbeinu Bechaye[19]), who states that even though the child died, his mother was not Jewish. And since there is no issue of tumas ohel by Gentiles, Eliyahu would not have been exposed to tuma as long as he did not touch the child while resuscitating him.  

B) The Child Did Not Actually Die

Another simple solution is to question the very premise that this child died. The Radvaz[20] and the Shitah Mekubetzes[21] suggest that the child may not have actually died, but was rather very faint and on the verge of dying. Thus, there was no issue of tuma. (This is the opinion of the Radak[22] as well.)

However, this would still not necessarily completely resolve the issue, since there is an opinion mentioned in the Gemara (Nazir) that a kohen cannot even be exposed to a goses (one on the verge of death)?

But we could probably solve this problem as well with any of the following solutions:

1. We might not hold of this opinion l'Halacha.
2. Even if we do hold of this opinion, this might only be a gezeirah Dirabanan[23]
3. Even if this is a din Di'Oraisa, and a goses actually does give off tuma, it might still be muttar because of V’Chai Bahem or Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas.[24]

• Rethinking the Definition of Death 

In a related sense, we could also suggest a similar approach, questioning the definition of death and the nature of tumas missah. If death is the permanent separation of the body and soul, and tumas meis is what occurs when the soul leaves the body, then it is possible to suggest that tumas missah only occurs when death is permanent.[25]

This seems to be what the Shitah Mekubetzes[26] means when he suggests that because the child will ultimately be revived, it is considered within Halacha as if he is still alive.[27]

Another option is that even if he did give off momentary tuma, retroactively, once he was revived, there was no problem for Eliyahu to have been exposed to this tuma, because once the child was revived, this problem of tumas meis was retroactively nullified and it is as if there was never any tuma in the first place.

C) The Dead Body of a True Tzaddik Doesn't Give off Tuma

The Aruch Lener[28] and the Tzlach[29] suggest a truly fascinating answer: there is a principle in halacha that a pure tzaddik does release any tuma when they die; and according to a mesorah that is mentioned by several rishonim, the Ben Ishah Ha’Tzarfatis was actually Mashiach ben Yosef. As such, since this child was a pure tzaddik, the Aruch Lener and the Tzlach suggest that he did not give off any tuma, and this is why Eliyahu was able to resuscitate him.[30]

The Aruch Lener provides another potential proof for his shitah that the Ben Ishah Ha’Tzarfatis did not give off any tuma when he died:

The Gemara in Niddah[31] asks whether a meis is mitameh after it is revived. However, while they ask this question regarding the case of techiyas ha'meisim by Elisha, they make no mention of the case of Eliyahu and the Ben Ishah Ha’Tzarfatis. The Aruch Lener suggests that the reason they did not mention the case of Eliyahu is simply because there was no question of tuma in the case of the Ben Ishah Ha’Tzarfatis – and this supports the above suggestion (that the Ben Ishah Ha’Tzarfatis did not give off any tuma when he died).[32]

D) Eliyahu Ha’Navi Was Not Really Pinchas

The Radvaz[33] provides another possible solution, explaining why there was no issue of tuma. The Radvaz suggests that even if Eliyahu was Pinchas, perhaps this only means that Eliyahu had the same neshama as Pinchas[34]. If this is the case, it is possible that Eliyahu was Halachically a kohen – as this would depend on his biological lineage, not on the nature of his neshama.[35]

Of course, the Gemara in Bava Metzia 114a would pose a problem to this approach, because the Gemara’s entire question was based on the assumption that Eliyahu was a kohen. As such, Eliyahu should have simply answered: "I am not a kohen." The fact that he did not give this answer implies that Eliyahu was, in fact, a kohen.[36]

E) Hora'as Sha'ah: A Complete Exception

In general, when approaching a question, we can either:

1. Accept the question and give a fundamental answer (in this case – accepting that it would have been a problem for Eliyahu to have been exposed to tuma, but it was muttar because of pikuach nefesh)
2. Reject the question by questioning its underlying premise (in this case – explaining that there was no issue of tuma to begin with, either because the child did not give off any tuma or because Eliyahu was not a kohen)

However, there is also a third approach to answering the question, which is giving a technical answer – suggesting that the case in question is an exception to the rule. That is to that, while normally, this would be a valid question, there is a technical detail that we did not know about which explains the current case in question.

The Radvaz[37] provides this type of answer as another possible explanation, suggesting that even though it would normally be assur for a kohen to be exposed to tumah, it was muttar in this specific situation because it was hora'as sha'ah – an exception to the rule. The Radvaz explains that perhaps it was muttar for Eliyahu to be exposed to tuma in order to create a kiddush Hashem by resuscitating the child. It could also have prevented a major chilul Hashem, for if the child would have died, the child’s mother might have blamed the death on Eliyahu, which would have resulted in a major chilul Hashem. Thus, by saving the child, Eliyahu would provide a huge kiddush Hashem, and this would therefore justify his being exposed to tumas meis.

Additionally, the Radvaz suggests that it would have been muttar for Eliyahu to be exposed to tuma for the sake of meis mitzvah – the special mitzvah of burying a dead body when the meis has no relatives to bury them.[38] Thus, once Eliyahu was allowed to touch the child to bury him, he would also have been allowed to try to resuscitate him first, before burying him.

In our next article, we will continue to analyze this fascinating halachic topic.

[1] As we mentioned above, this would depend on whether we can assume that the fetus will be able to survive pregnancy and grow up to the age where it can successfully perform mitzvos.

[2] Erchin 7a.

[3] חידושי הרמב"ן מסכת נדה דף מד עמוד ב

והא דתנן וההורגו חייב. ודוקא בן יום אחד אבל עובר לא דלא קרינא ביה נפש אדם, וה"נ אמרינן בסנהדרין (ע"ב ב') האשה שהיא מקשה לילד מביאין סכין ומחתכין אותו אבר אבר יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש, אלמא מעיקרא ליכא משום הצלת נפש וקרא נמי כתיב דמשלם דמי ולדות, ואיכא דקשיא ליה מההיא דגרסינן התם בערכין (ז' ב') האשה שהיא יושבת על המשבר ומתה בשבת מביאין סכין וקורעין אותה ומוציאין הולד ממנה ואמאי מחללין שבת כיון שאינו קרוי נפש, וליכא למימר דהתם ביושבת על המשבר דוקא משום דכיון דעיקר גופא אחרינא הוא כדאיתמר התם בערכין, במקשה לילד לא בעינן יושבת על המשבר, ועוד דהכא בן יום אחד תנן, וקרא דגבי דמי ולדות אפילו ביושבת על המשבר היא ולא אמרינן התם דכילוד הוא, אלא גופא אחרינא הוא דקאמרינן לומר שממתינין לה עד שתלד ואח"כ ממיתין אותה, ולא מיתרבי מגם שניהם דאפילו קודם שתשב על המשבר כלל אי לאו קרא דגם לא הוה קטלינן לולד כדמפורש התם, אבל לענין לידה דבר ברור הוא שאינו בכלל נפש אדם עד שיוולד כדאמרינן, ולאו קושיא היא התם אמרה תורה חלל עליו שבת אחת כדי שיקיים שבתות הרבה, וההיא דאמרינן במס' שבת (קנ"א ב') תינוק בן יום אחד חי מחללין עליו את השבת לאו לאפוקי עובר אלא גוזמא היא כדי לומר דוד מלך ישראל מת אין מחללין עליו את השבת.

[4] חידושי הריטב"א מסכת נדה דף מד עמוד ב

דכתיב ואיש כי יכה כל נפש אדם. פירוש ואפי' קטן בן יום אחד קרוי נפש, הקשו בתוספות דאילו הכא משמע דעובר לא חשיב נפש וכן משמע מהכה את האשה ויצאו ילדיה שאין שם [אלא] תשלומי ממון דמי ולדות כשפחה הנמכרת בשוק כדאיתא בב"ק (מ"ח ב'), והכי נמי משמע מהא דאמרינן בסנהדרין (ע"ב ב') האשה שהיא מקשה לילד חותכין את הולד ומוציאין אבר אבר יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש, אלמא עובר לאו נפש הוא, ואיכא למידק דא"כ היכי אמרינן בפ"ק דערכין (ז' א') האשה שישבה על המשבר ומתה בשבת מביאין סכין וקורעין אותה ומוציאין את הולד וכיון דלאו נפש הוא היכי מחללין עליה את השבת, וראיתי מי שכתב דהא לא קשיא כלל דחתוך בשר מת אין בו אלא מצות פרוש מדבריהם, והיינו טעמא דמהלינן ספקות בשבת ממה נפשך כדאיתא בפרק רבי אליעזר (שבת קל"ו א'), ונראה שנעלמה ממנו מה שאמרו במסכת ערכין דאקשינן פשיטא מאי עביד מחתך בשר הוא ואמר רבא לא נצרכה אלא להביא סכין דרך רשות הרבים ומעתה קושיית התוספות צריכה רבה, ותירצו דאע"ג דלאו נפש הוא היינו לחייב ההורגו או לדחות נפש אמו כדי שלא יגעו בו, אבל לענין הצלתו בשבת דינו כנפש דהא שייך לומר בו טעמא דאמרינן גבי בן קיימא חלל עליו שבת אחת כדי שישמור שבתות הרבה, ולפירוש זה עוברה שהריחה כשם שמחללין שבת מפניה אם הוריקו פניה כך מחללין מפני הולד, כן כתב בעל הלכות גדולות ז"ל, ויש מתרצים דשאני התם דכיון שכבר מתה האם הרי הוא עומד לעצמו ואינו נגרר אחרי אמו ואינו אלא כמי שנפלה עליו מפולת או שננעלה דלת לפניו שמחללין עליו את השבת, אלא דכיון דספקא הוא ואין לו חיות גמור אפילו כזה ההורגו פטור, אבל כשאמו בחיים הרי הוא כאחד מאבריה וכירך אמו ואין מחללין עליו את השבת ועוברה שהריחה אין מחללין שבת אלא בשבילה, והפירוש הראשון יותר נכון.

[5] Fascinatingly, the Gemara continues by saying that the concern we had was that there was no certainty/chazakah that the fetus had life, so we might have thought that Shabbos could not be pushed aside for such a case of safek pikuach nefesh; thus, the Gemara is teaching us that even in a case of safek, we can push aside Shabbos for the sake of pikuach nefesh. If the case of the Gemara is a nefesh, then the Gemara is confirming what we already know: that V’Chai Bahem works in a case of safek pikuach nefesh. However, if we are talking about a fetus that is not a fetus is not a nefesh, and we are using the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas, then this Gemara would be a proof that V’Chai Bahem transformed or revealed the fact that Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas can now work in the case of a safek as well, even when V’Chai Bahem cannot be used.

[6] הר"ן על הרי"ף מסכת יומא דף ג עמוד ב

וכתב הרמב"ן ז"ל דמדקאמר משום סכנת ולד משמע דאפילו ליכא למיחש לדידה מחללין והיינו דגרסינן בשלהי פ"ק דערכין (דף ז א) אמר רב נחמן אמר שמואל האשה שישבה על המשבר ומתה בשבת מביאין סכין ומקרעין את כריסה ומוציאין את הולד פשיטא מאי עביד מחתך בשר בעלמא הוא אמר רבא לא נצרכה אלא להביא סכין דרך רשות הרבים מאי קמ"ל דמספיקא מחללין שבתא תנינא ספק חי ספק מת ספק עכו"ם ספק ישראל מפקחין מ"ד התם הוא דה"ל חזקה דחיותא אבל הכא דלא ה"ל חזקה דחיותא מעיקרא אימא לא קמ"ל ואף על גב דתנן [אהלות ספ"ז] האשה המקשה לילד מביאין סכין ומחתכין אותו אבר אבר יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש דאלמא מעיקרא לית ביה משום הצלת נפשות ותנן נמי גבי תינוק בן יום אחד [נדה מד א] וההורגו חייב ודוקא בן יום אחד אבל עובר לא וקרא נמי כתיב דמשלם דמי ולדות אפ"ה לענין שמירת מצות מחללין עליו אמרה תורה חלל עליו שבת אחת שמא ישמור שבתות הרבה הלכך אפילו בהצלת עובר פחות מבן מ' יום שאין בו חיות כלל מחללין כדעת בעל הלכות ז"ל ואיכא מ"ד שאין מחללין משום נפלים אלא עוברה שהריחה חששה דמיתה דידה היא שכל המפלת בחזקת סכנה היא וטעמא דיושבת על המשבר טעמא אחרינא הוא דכיון שמתה הוא כילוד ולא כירך אמו הוא ולאו בדידה תלי אלא חי הוא ודלת ננעלה בפניו אלא דלא הוה ליה חזקה דחיותא אלו דבריו ז"ל בספר תורת האדם ואין צריך לכל הדקדוקין הללו דהא לא משכחת סכנת עובר בלא סכנת עוברה ולא סכנת עוברה בלא סכנת עובר דמפלת בחזקת סכנה היא וכן פרש"י ז"ל דאם אינה אוכלת שניהם מסוכנים:

[7] See also העמק שאלה א:ח and העמק שאלה קסז:יז.

[8] Bava Metzia 114b.

[9] Rashi brings down the famous opinion of Chazal that Eliyahu was in fact Pinchas Ha'Kohen; there is a debate whether Chazal think Pinchas never died, or that Eliyahu was a gilgul (reincarnation) of Pinchas. The reason for this connection is that both Pinchas and Eliyahu were zealots on behalf of Hashem; Pinchas expressed this in the case of Zimri, and Eliyahu expressed this most potently by Har Carmel. Rashi’s lashon is as follows:

רש"י מסכת בבא מציעא דף קיד עמוד ב

לאו כהן מר - דאיכא למאן דאמר דאליהו הוא פינחס, דכתיב ביה קנא קנאתי וכן בפינחס בקנאו את קנאתי.

[10] According to most poskim, this is the reason Kohanim are allowed to enter hospitals; because unless we know otherwise, we can assume that none of the deceased bodies are Jews, so there is no issue of tuma.

[11] תוספות מסכת בבא מציעא דף קיד עמוד ב

אמר ליה לאו כהן (אתה) - תימה לר"י היאך החיה בנה של האלמנה כיון שכהן היה דכתיב (מלכים א יז) ויתמודד על הילד וגו' ויש לומר שהיה ברור לו שיחייהו לכך היה מותר משום פיקוח נפש.

[12] Melachim 1:17.

[13] מלכים א פרק יז פסוק יז

וַיְהִ֗י אַחַר֙ הַדְּבָרִ֣ים הָאֵ֔לֶּה חָלָ֕ה בֶּן־הָאִשָּׁ֖ה בַּעֲלַ֣ת הַבָּ֑יִת וַיְהִ֤י חָלְיוֹ֙ חָזָ֣ק מְאֹ֔ד עַ֪ד אֲשֶׁ֥ר לֹא־נֽוֹתְרָה־ בּ֖וֹ נְשָׁמָֽה:

[14] Bava Metzia 114b.

[15] Or transformed it

[16] And even according to those who hold that V’Chai Bahem did reveal/transform this aspect of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas, it is possible that this only applies when V’Chai Bahem is still able to be utilized as well. But since V’Chai Bahem is unable to be applied in this case, this aspect of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas would therefore not apply either, and it would thus need to be a vadai.

[17] העמק שאלה קסז:יז

[18] שו"ת רדב"ז חלק ו סימן ב אלפים רג

וראיתי לרבינו בחיי שכתב דצרפית נכרית היתה ומתי עכו"ם אינם מטמאין באוהל כר"ש ולפי זה הא דכתיב ויתמודד עליו לא נגע בו אלא האהיל עליו לבד וכן אמר אליהו עצמו בדוכתא אחריתי קברי עכו"ם אינם מטמאין באוהל וכן פסק הרמב"ם ז"ל וגם זה אינו נכון 

[19] Bamidbar 25:11.

[20] שו"ת רדב"ז חלק ו סימן ב אלפים רג

יש אומרים שלא מת ממש והכי משמע מדכתיב עד שלא נותרה בו נשמה... משמע שעדיין לא מת והכי משמע נמי בסוף נדה דאיבעיא להו בן השונמית מהו שיטמא ומדלא איבעיא להו בבן הצרפית דקדים משמע דס"ל דלא מת ואין דרך זה נכון כלל דכתיב להמית את בני וכתיב ויאמר אליהו ראה חי בנך והכי הול"ל ראי לא מת בנך ....ונתברר בכמה מקומות בתלמוד ובמדרשות שאליהו החיה את המתים

[21] שיטה מקובצת מסכת בבא מציעא דף קיד עמוד ב

תלמיד הר"פ

לאו כהן מר. תימה לר"י היאך החיה בנה של האלמנה וכו' כמו שכתוב בתוספות. ויש לומר דלא מת ממש אלא נתעלף והיינו דכתיב עד אשר לא נותר בו נשמה.

[22] רד"ק מלכים א פרק יז פסוק יז

עד אשר לא נותרה בו נשמה - יש מי שאומר שלא מת מכל וכל אלא היה חליו חזק מאד עד שנעצרה נשימתו ולא היו מכירין ממנו שום סימן חיות לא בנשימה ולא בדפק הגידים עד שחשבה אמו כי מת הוא וכן הוא אומר בדניאל לא נותרה בי נשמה אבל אותו הוא על דרך הפלגה והנכון כי מת מיתה גמורה כמו שסוברין בני העולם:

[23] Out of concern that the goses might die and cause the kohen to be metameh; and for the sake of pikuach nefesh, Chazal might not have restricted this particular type of case.

[24] Additionally, the tuma that comes from a goses could be a lower level of tuma, given the fact that a goses still has some life left within him.

[25] Granted, death is never permanent or irreversible, as there will be techiyas ha'meisim. But for our discussion, we are referring to permanence within the short term – until techiyas ha'meisim.

[26] שיטה מקובצת מסכת בבא מציעא דף קיד עמוד ב

ולמאן דאמר כהן אסור בגוסס צריך לומר כיון שהיה סופו לחיות כחי דמי.

תלמיד הר"ף:

[27] This would actually work quite well within the wording of Tosafos (Bava Metzia 114a) that we mentioned above. Only because Eliyahu knew that he would be able to revive the child, the child was therefore not considered dead. Therefore, because he wasn't considered to be dead according to Halacha, it's possible that the child either didn't give off any tuma. However, this is probably not pshat in Tosafos, because according to Tossfos, it was only muttar because of pikuach nefesh. Meaning, Tosafos seems to hold that there was an issur of tuma, but it's muttar because of pikuach nefesh. However, according to the answers we just presented, we don't even need the svara of pikuach nefesh, because there is no aveirah or issue of tuma to begin with.

[28] ערוך לנר מסכת נדה דף ע עמוד ב

י"ל עוד ביישוב קושיא זו ע"פ מה שהביאו התוס' עוד שם בסמוך כשהי' קובר את ר"ע שא"ל וכי אינך כהן שהשיב צדיקים אינם מטמאים ואף על פי שכתבו התוס' שם שזה לא הי' עיקר טעמו אלא משום דר"ע מת מצוה הי' מכ"מ הדין אמת שצדיקים אינם מטמאים ע"פ שיטת רבינו חיים כמו שכתבו התוס' בכתובות (קג ב ד"ה אותו) ועיין מה שכתבתי בספרי ערוך לנר סוכה (כה ב) ואיתא בתנא דבי אליהו הביאוהו ג"כ התוס' בב"מ שם אותו הילד משיח בן יוסף הי' ולכן ל"ק היאך טימא אליהו כשהחיהו דהרי לשיטתו צדיקים אינן מטמאין ולכן א"ש ג"כ למה לא שאלו על בן הצרפית מהו שיטמא דבזה הי' פשיטא להם דלא הי' מטמא דאל"כ היאך טימא לו אליהו שכהן הי' אלא ודאי שטעמו הי' דצדיקים אינם מטמאים במותם כש"כ לאחר שהחיהו:

[29] צל"ח מסכת נדה דף ע עמוד ב

גמרא בן שונמית מהו שיטמא וכו'. והקשה אמ"ו אמאי לא מיבעיא מבן צרפתית שהחיה אליהו. וי"ל דהא אליהו כהן הוי, וכתיב ויקח אליהו את וכו' ויורידהו וכו'. ורבינו חיים כהן אמר [עי' כתובות ק"ג ע"ב תוד"ה אותו] אילו הוא היה בימים ההם כשמת ר"ת היה מטמא לו משום דצדיקים קדושים הם ואינן מטמאין כדאמרינן [סוטה מ"ט ע"א] משמת רבי בטלה כהונה. ויש מפרשים שבטלה הכהונה משום דרבי נשיא הוי והיו כל ישראל קרובים אצלו, כי מפני כבודו היה חשוב כמו מת מצוה. ור"ח כהן מפרש דבטלה כהונה משום דצדיק גמור היה ומטמאינן לצדיקים. והשתא אבן צרפתית לא קשה מידי, דהא אליהו היה נושאו מן העליה ונתן לאמו, כדכתיב [מלכים א' י"ז, כ"ג] ויתנהו לאמו, והשתא היאך היה נושא אותו והא כהן הוי כדאמרינן. אלא על כרחך משום דבן צרפתית צדיק היה ולכך אינו מטמא. אבל אבן שונמית ליכא למימר דצדיק היה, דבן שנה הוי, ומיבעיא שפיר, ודוק.

[30] Why doesn't a true tzaddik's body give off tumah? The explanation would be as follows:

The concept of tuma is essentially the void of a spiritual life force that once was once within a physical body. As such, tuma is always associated with death. When one's soul leaves their body, tuma results. Similarly, when a woman goes into niddah, a potential child - a potential life - leaves her body.

However, there is one exception. In a body-soul relationship, the goal is for the body to essentially reflect the soul. If the soul is the inner life-force – the higher consciousness, mind, intellect, and spiritual root of the self – then the ideal body would live a life of actions that fully reveal, reflect, and express the potential and true nature of the soul. Most people, however, are not perfect. At times, they are able to tap into their higher ratzon and live a life of truth and avodas Hashem; but at other times, they are swayed by their lower self and give in to temptation and their lower drives. As such, most people have a body that serves partially as a vessel for their neshama and partially as a tool for selfishness and aveiros. Tzaddikim lean towards the good and risha'im lean towards the bad.

The more we misuse our body, the more we think that we are a body. Thus, the pain of death is the belief that there is something called death. For if one believes that they are a soul, then there is no such thing as death; merely the leaving of one's body, like one takes off a coat.

Our goal in life is for our inner self (our neshama) to use our body to fulfill our purpose in this world and live a life of truth and avodas Hashem. The ikar (main entity) is our neshama and the tafel (secondary entity) is our body. Like a person who drives a car, or a fruit inside of a peel, the main entity is never the vessel, but the essence inside. If one lives a life of avodas Hashem, Torah, and mitzvos, then their soul and their body both receive reward, which is the purpose of techiyas ha'meisim. The soul initially leaves the body and goes to Olam Ha'Neshamos while the body remains in this world and decomposes – except for the Luz Bone. The reason the body decomposes is because it is physical, and thus finite. Thus, just as every organic physical entity rots and decomposes when it loses its life force, the same occurs to our physical body when we leave this world. Then, when techiyas ha'meisim occurs, the body is reborn from the Luz bone, and the body and soul are reunited as one.

There is one exception: a true tzaddik. The more one lives a truly spiritual life of Torah and mitzvos, the more their body – their vessel – becomes infused with kedushah, with life, with soul. And the more one infuses their body with soul, the more their body remains full of soul, even after they die. Because even though the soul itself has left, the soul that became infused in the body does not leave, as the body itself has become more spiritual and less physical. For most, this would merely cause the decaying and decomposition stage to delay, but not avoid it altogether.

However, for a true tzaddik, for one who achieved true perfection, the body itself would become spiritual. (For example: Adam Ha'Rishon's "body" was in Gan Eden/Olam Ha'Neshamos, because his body was transcendent.) If a body became truly perfect, then even at when they died, their body would not give off any tuma (or at least not the type of tuma that would make a kohen tamei), because the body itself has become fully kadosh; there is still kedushah and neshama present within the guf.

Therefore, if Ben Tzarfat was Mashiach Ben Yosef – a true tzaddik – then he would not have given off any tuma when he died, and this would explain why Eliyahu did not become tamei when resuscitating him.

Interestingly, this is also one of the explanations for how Eliyahu was able to enter Shamayim without dying. His body had become so kadosh that he did not need to leave his body behind in order to enter the spiritual world. (The Ramchal explains that Moshe Rabbeinu, Eliyahu Ha’Navi, and Chanoch were three examples of people whose bodies were able to enter the spiritual realm without leaving their physical bodies behind.)

[31] 70b.

[32] Of course, this proof is not limited to the current explanation which suggests that Ben Tzarfat was a tzaddik and therefore did not give off any tuma. All the answers we have already given earlier which explain why Ben Tzarfat did not give off tuma could also be used to explain why the Gemara made no mention of Ben Tzarfat.

Additionally, just because the Gemara did not mention Eliyahu and Ben Tzarfat does not mean that there was no issue of tuma in that case as well.

[33] שו"ת רדב"ז חלק ו סימן ב אלפים רג

ולפי דעת חכמי הנסתרות לא קשיא כלל כי האומר פנחס זה אליהו שורש נשמתו של פנחס וכשאמרו לו ולאו כהן הוא מר לא רצה לגלות הסוד

[34] As in, Eliyahu was a gilgul of Pinchas.

[35] And even though Pinchas earned his kehunah through his act of zeolotry, that might have been different, since his father and brothers were kohanim, so his situation was completely unique and he might have already had the natural potential of becoming a kohen. As such, we would not be able to apply the same idea to Eliyahu.

[36] However, the Radvaz suggests that this is a deeper topic (divrei sod); as such, it is possible that Eliyahu did not want to reveal the nature of this deep topic to the one asking the question. (It is also possible that Elyahu was not giving a halachic answer to the question.)

[37] שו"ת רדב"ז חלק ו סימן ב אלפים רג

עוד יש לפרש דהוראת שעה היתה כדי שיתקדש שם שמים על ידו....

עוד יש לפרשו דמת מצוה שאין לו קוברים היה והטומאה דחויה היא אצלו ולשני הפירושים האלו התמודד עליו ונגע בו ושניהם חדשתי אני ועל הראשון אני סומך דהוראת שעה היתה. הנה כתבתי לך כל מה שיש אצלי בתירוץ קושיא זו ואתה תבחר

[38] If this child had no relatives who were capable of burying him, then it would have been muttar for Elyahu to touch him for the sake of burying him. We would therefore have to say that the child's parents and family were not able/willing to bury him.