Pikuach Nefesh: Are We Always Allowed to Save a Life? (Part 3)

Comparing V’Chai Bahem to Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas

It emerges from our previous discussion that we appear to have two different sources for the heter of violating an aveirah for the sake of Pikuach Nefesh: V’Chai Bahem and Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas

Before we see the major Nafkah Minos between these two sources, let us briefly analyze each of them in a bit more detail.

V’Chai Bahem

The Torah tells us “V’Chai Bahem” – that we should live by the mitzvos, and not die by them. This teaches us the supreme value of life and that in order to save our own life, or the life of another, one can even violate an aveirah. Because the term V’Chai Bahem is so definite, the Gemara concludes that this source would even apply in the case of a safek.

Furthermore, this source indicates that when violating an aveirah to save a life, there do not seem to be any conditions or requirements that must be met in order to utilize the principle of V’Chai Bahem; just the fact that Hashem values life more than mitzvos is enough to override an aveirah to save a life.

Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas

We already know that, depending on how we understand the maskana of the Gemara, Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas might not apply in the case of a safek. However, the actual words "Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas Kidei Lishmor Shabbasos Harbei," raises more questions as well. Let us begin by addressing the underlying logic of this principle. It appears that the underlying logic of this principle is as follows:

We know that Shabbos is infinitely valuable, and violating Shabbos is such a severe aveirah that the onesh for its violation is the death penalty (Skilah); nevertheless, if the violation of Shabbos would allow one to keep many more Shabbasos, then such a violation would be justified.

Because of the nature of this logical equation, several important questions arise:

• The Mitzvah Being Violated

Is the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas only teaching us that one is allowed to violate Shabbos in order to save a life? Or, is this a more universal svara, teaching us that in order to save a life, one can violate any aveirah in the Torah?

To the extent that violating Shabbos is unique and more chamur than violating most other aveiros, it would emerge that this is a unique svara for Shabbos alone. However, if all aveiros in the Torah are weighty enough to potentially require us to give up our lives in order to avoid violating them, we could apply this svara to all aveiros in the Torah. In other words, even though the weight of violating an aveirah is tremendous, Hashem would rather that we violate this one aveirah so that we can continue to live and keep many more mitzvos in the future.

• The Mitzvah You Are Going to be Mikayim (Fulfill) in the Future

Even if the principle of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas is a svara that applies uniquely to Shabbos – where it only permits one to violate Shabbos in order to save a life – we still need to clarify the nature of the requirement necessary to fulfill this svara. Is it only that one can violate Shabbos if they are going to keep more Shabbasos? Or, is Shabbos merely an example being given, but really, one can violate Shabbos as long as they will keep many more mitzvos in the future, not limited to the specific example of Shabbos. (In other words, if one were not going to live more than a few more days, would this svara still apply for them?)

Furthermore, what does "many more" Shabbasos actually mean? It seems to imply that it must be more than one, but how many more? Does two suffice? Ten? One hundred?[1] And if we're going to take this literally, then what about a case where one requires pikuach nefesh on Yom Kippur, a day referred to by the Torah as a Shabbos Shabbason. Would this person need to keep another Yom Kippur in order for us to save his life? Or perhaps many more Yom Kippurim?

To take this a step further, if the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas is not limited to Shabbos, but is actually a universal svara, then what would the halacha be in a case where one needs to violate a non-Shabbos related aveirah in order to save a life, such as eating non-kosher food? Would this only be warranted if they are able to keep many more Shabbasos in the future? Or, would this even apply if they are able to keep many more non-Shabbos related mitzvos? (And would these mitzvos have to be related to the aveirah that they are violating, such as, in this case, eating kosher food?) In other words, must the fulfillment of this svara always be keeping more Shabbasos, even if this svara applies to other mitzvos and aveiros? Or, if this svara also applies to other mitzvos and aveiros, can this svara be fulfilled with a more generic fulfilment of future mitzvos, not limited to Shabbos? How particular would we be, and how generic would this concept become?

The more that this concept is founded in the unique kedushah of Shabbos, the more it would remain a uniquely Shabbos svara – where the only way to push aside a Shabbos is to keep many more Shabbsos. However, the more this is a general svara, acknowledging the importance of the bigger picture and the value of performing many mitzvos over the course of one's lifetime, the more this kind of logic would apply in a universal context. Shabbos might be the most paradigmatic example, but this kind of svara would apply to all other mitzvos and aveiros as well (except for the “Big 3” cardinal aveiros).[2] 

Nafkah Minos:

1) What if the person whose life we are saving will (likely) not live until the next Shabbos?

If the only reason we are allowed to violate Shabbos in order to save a life is because of the svara of
"Kidei Lishmor Shabbasos Harbei – so that he will keep many more Shabbasos,” then this svara would not apply in a case where the person we are saving will (likely) not live until the next Shabbos, since he won't be keeping any future Shabbasos.

As a matter of fact, even if he does live until the next Shabbos, but not until the second Shabbos, he still would not have fulfilled the requirement of keeping "many" more Shabbasos. And if we are being extra midakdek, we still don't know if keeping two Shabbasos qualifies as "many Shabbasos," so even two Shabbasos might still not be enough as well.

However, if the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas is not limited to the fulfillment of Shabbos, but even fulfilling many more "mitzvos in general" would qualify as fulfilling this svara, then even if the person we are saving would not live until the next Shabbos, we would most likely be allowed to override Shabbos to save their life – assuming this person will be able to fulfill many mitzvos.

Of course, if the source for pikuach nefesh on Shabbos is V’chai Bahem, then the reason we can push aside Shabbos to save a life is because of the innate value of saving life, and not contingent upon any future act or fulfilled requirement. Thus, even in a case where the person will not live until the next Shabbos (and even if they won’t be able to keep any more mitzvos at all), we would still be able to override Shabbos in order to save their life.

2) What if the person whose life we are saving will (likely) not keep any future Shabbasos?

When it comes to saving the life of someone who will (likely) not keep any future Shabbasos, there are two important categories to analyze:

A) One Who is Not Shomer Torah U'Mitzvos

If the person whose life needs saving is not Shomer Shabbos, then the svara of "Kidei Sheyishmor Shabbasos Harbei –  so that they will keep many more Shabbasos" would likely not apply, since they will likely not keep any future Shabbasos. Is it possible that they will one day keep future Shabbasos? Of course. But that likelihood might not be concrete enough to utilize this svara and justify transgressing Shabbos. 

In contrast, if the source for pikuach nefesh on Shabbos is V’Chai Bahem, then the reason we can push aside Shabbos is because of the innate value of saving life, and not contingent upon any future act or fulfilled requirement. Thus, even in a case where the person might not keep any future Shabbasos, we would still be able to push aside Shabbos to save their life.

B) A Baby

Regarding our ability to use the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas for a katan (minor), especially for a baby, we find ourselves in a very interesting situation. While this baby will not be keeping Shabbos in the near future, down the line, we expect that he will be able to keep many more Shabbasos. But can we make that type of calculation? What if this katan won't keep Shabbos for another 10, 11, or 12 years?! Can we push aside Shabbos now so that they will keep Shabbos in 12 years from now? And so much can happen in 12 years that we cannot control. Does this affect our ability to use this svara?[3]

However, once again, if the source for pikuach nefesh on Shabbos is V’Chai Bahem, then the reason we can push aside Shabbos is because of the innate value of saving life, and not contingent upon any future act or fulfilled requirement. Thus, even in a case where the person might not keep any future Shabbasos, we would still be able to push aside Shabbos to save their life. 

Shitos in the Rishonim and Achronim

1) Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas Only Applies to Shabbos

The Rashash[4] suggests that when pushing aside Shabbos to save someone's life, the person being saved would need to be expected to live until the next Shabbos, or at the very least, the life-saving efforts would have to extend his current Shabbos so that he would be able to fulfill the rest of the present Shabbos. 

In other words, the Rashash understands the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas as follows: the violation of Shabbos is only justified if it will allow this person to keep "more Shabbos." If violating Shabbos will only allow this person to have more weekday life, then even if he will be able to keep many more mitzvos, this is not enough to justify the violation of Shabbos. 

The Ohr Ha'Chaim[5] similarly states that the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas only applies if the person will live until the next Shabbos.

In a related sense, the Mei'ri has a very interesting shitah that might be fundamentally connected to the approach of the Rashash and the Ohr Ha’Chaim. The Gemara in Yoma[6] states that one can violate Shabbos in order to save someone's life, even if by saving this person they would only have chayei sha'ah (a very short time) left to live.[7] The lashon of the Gemara is as follows:

תלמוד בבלי מסכת יומא דף פה עמוד א

מצאוהו חי מפקחין. מצאוהו חי פשיטא! - לא צריכא, דאפילו לחיי שעה.

If they found him alive, they continue to remove the debris. The Gemara is surprised at this: If they find him alive, it is obvious that they remove the debris, since that is saving a life. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that one must desecrate Shabbos for his sake even if it is clear that he will live only a short while and will die soon after.

The Mei'ri[8] explains this Gemara as follows: even though this person might only live for another few more minutes, we are still allowed to violate Shabbos to save him because he will be able to say viduy and do teshuva.

This is quite a peculiar shitah, and it requires explanation. At first glance, this appears to go against the principle of V’Chai Bahem, because V’Chai Bahem should apply without any external requirements, as it is rooted in the inherent value of life. However, this also seems to conflict with the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas, since this person will likely not be able to keep many more Shabbosos. And even though he will be able to keep a few more moments of the current Shabbos, the Mei'ri does not mention this as the svara to justify our pushing aside Shabbos. Instead, he says that it is because he will be able to say viduy and do teshuva. What relevance does teshuva have to justify our pushing aside Shabbos for pikuach nefesh?

For this reason, the Biur Halacha[9] suggests that the Mei'ri actually holds of V’Chai Bahem and therefore must not have really meant that saying viduy and performing teshuva is a required condition, since V’Chai Bahem does not have any external requirements. 

However, the Pardeis Yosef[10] provides a fascinating explanation for the Mei'ri, suggesting as follows: by doing teshuva, one is misakein (fixes) all the times in the past that they may have violated Shabbos. Thus, even though this person will not be able to keep any more future Shabbsos, by saving his life, he will still be able to retroactively keep many more past Shabbasos! Thus, according to the Pardeis Yosef, the Mei'ri rules that the only reason we can violate Shabbos to save this person's life is because, through teshuva, he will be able to retroactively keep many more Shabbasos.[11]

2) Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas Applies to Other Mitzvos as Well (Even if the Person Won't Live Until the Next Shabbos)

In Tosafos Yom Ha’Kippurim,[12] it is suggested that the lashon of "Kidei Lishmor Shabasos Harbei" is not meant to be taken literally, but rather refers to the fulfillment of any future mitzvos. Thus, even if one will not be able to survive until the next Shabbos, we can still use the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas, because during the time that he lives he will be able to keep more mitzvos.

The Biur Halacha[13] agrees with this approach, and even suggests that the Meiri [quoted above] actually rules this way as well. In other words, the Biur Halacha suggests that when the Mei'ri required the person to be able to perform teshuva, what the Mei’ri actually meant is that since the act of teshuva is a mitzvah, this mitzvah of teshuva is enough to warrant the pushing aside of Shabbos.[14] 

The shitah of the Mei'ri is clearly a great case study, as his approach can potentially fit into several of the ways we've approached this sugya. Thus far, we have seen three ways of understanding the Mei'ri:

1. V’Chai Bahem: no requirement when engaging in pikuach nefesh on Shabbos (Biur Halacha)
2. Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas as a fundamental Shabbos concept: One can only push aside Shabbos if they will be able to keep more "Shabbasos" because of it. (Pardeis Yosef)
3. Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas as a more universal concept: one can push aside Shabbos for pikuach nefesh as long as they will be able to keep more mitzvos because of it. (The simple understanding of the Mei'ri)

3) Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas as a Universal Principle

When referring to the power of Beis Din, the Rambam states that a Beis Din can temporarily violate an aveirah in order to prevent many Jews from violating many aveiros. His lashon is as follows:

רמב"ם הלכות ממרים פרק ב הלכה ד

ויש לבית דין לעקור אף דברים אלו לפי שעה אף על פי שהוא קטן מן הראשונים שלא יהו גזרות אלו חמורין מדברי תורה עצמה שאפילו דברי תורה יש לכל בית דין לעקרו הוראת שעה, כיצד בית דין שראו לחזק הדת ולעשות סייג כדי שלא יעברו העם על דברי תורה, מכין ועונשין שלא כדין אבל אין קובעין הדבר לדורות ואומרים שהלכה כך הוא, וכן אם ראו לפי שעה לבטל מצות עשה או לעבור על מצות לא תעשה כדי להחזיר רבים לדת או להציל רבים מישראל מלהכשל בדברים אחרים עושין לפי מה שצריכה השעה, כשם שהרופא חותך ידו או רגלו של זה כדי שיחיה כולו כך בית דין מורים בזמן מן הזמנים לעבור על קצת מצות לפי שעה כדי שיתקיימו [כולם] כדרך שאמרו חכמים הראשונים חלל עליו שבת אחת כדי שישמור שבתות הרבה.

"If they saw that it was necessary to temporarily nullify a positive commandment or violate a negative commandment in order to bring people at large back to the Jewish faith or to prevent many Jews from transgressing in other matters, they may do what is necessary at that time. To explain by analogy: Just like a doctor may amputate a person's hand or foot so that the person as a whole will live; so, too, at times, the court may rule to temporarily violate some of the commandments so that they will later keep all of them. In this vein, the Sages of the previous generations said: "Desecrate one Sabbath for a person's sake so that he will keep many Shabbasos."

We thus see how the Rambam abstracts the principle of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas to apply outside the strict limits of Shabbos. For the Rambam, the principle of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas essentially means: "we can violate a single issur now to ensure that there will be a much more positive outcome in the future."

When it comes to pushing aside Shabbos for the sake of pikuach nefesh, this concept applies to everyone; but the Rambam is suggesting an expansion of this concept, suggesting that Beis Din has the unique ability to apply this same fundamental concept if they believe it will result in the overall betterment of Klal Yisrael.

In our next article, we will continue to analyze this fascinating halachic topic.

[1] This is reminiscent of the famous “heap paradox” in which grains of sand are individually removed from a large heap of sand. Removing a single grain of sand does not turn a heap into a non-heap, and yet if the action is performed repeatedly, eventually the heap will, in fact, lose its status as a heap. The question is: At what point did it switch from a heap to a non-heap, if a single grain of sand cannot change its status?

[2] To extend this one last step further, we can ask whether this svara only applies to saving a life, or whether can we abstract it and turn it into a completely general principle of tradeoffs and value assessment. In other words, does this svara always allow us to push aside an aveirah when it will help one achieve a greater good in the future? Can one always violate an aveirah in order to perform many mitzvos? If no, why not? And if yes, when would this be the case? The case of the Gemara is talking about where one's life is on the line, and if not for violating Shabbos, they would die. As such, violating Shabbos is a last resort. This seems to imply that one can never proactively violate Shabbos in order to keep many more mitzvos. However, what if the aveirah is not as severe as Shabbos? Would it ever be muttar to proactively violate an aveirah in order to have the opportunity to perform many mitzvos? Does this type of "point system" and utilitarian philosophy have any basis in halacha?

[3] And for a shoteh, where it is possible that they will never be able to keep a future Shabbos, but it is not within their free will, what would the halacha be in such a case? Do we say that since they are not able to fulfill the requirement of keeping future Shabbosos, the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas should not apply? Or, like the Biur Halacha suggests, perhaps this would qualify as an oneis and we would therefore still be able to use the svara of Chaleil Alav Shabbos Achas. The lashon of the Biur Halacha is as follows:

ביאור הלכה סימן שכט סעיף ד ד"ה * אלא לפי

ולפ"ז ברור דאפילו קטן מרוצץ נמי מחללין אעפ"י דלא ישמור שבתות גם לא יתודה ולא יבוא לכלל גדול אעפ"כ מחללין וכמו ה"ה חרש ושוטה אף על גב דאינן בני מצות מ"מ מחללין עליהם דהא דלא מקיימי מצוה הוא משום אונסייהו ולא נפיק מכלל זה אלא ישראל מומר להכעיס דעובר במזיד אבל חרש ושוטה התורה פטרינהו מחמת אונסייהו

[4]

רש"ש מסכת יומא דף פד עמוד ב

דמאי איריא דשמא ימות בשבת הבא אפי' באחד בימות החול נמי (ואולי דדעתו ז"ל דאף דאמרינן לקמן (פה) דגם לחיי שעה מחללינן הוא דוקא דהח"ש הוא בשבת כגון דאם לא יעשו לו הרפואה ימות בשתי שעות ואם יעשו יחיה היום עוד שעה. או אם לא יעשו ימות קודם שבת הבאה ואם יעשו יחיה עוד שעה בשבת הבאה. אבל משום חיי שעה דחול לא כגון אם לא יעשו ימות למחר ביום א  ואם יעשו יחיה עד שבת הבא ולא שבת בכלל. ורמז לד"ז הוא מהלמוד של ר' שמעון ב"מ לקמן א"ת חלל עליו שבת אחת כדי שישמור שבתות הרבה. ועוד ראיה קצת ממנחות (מח) חטא בשבת כדי שתזכה בשבת אמרינן כו' ועמש"כ כעין זה בספ"א דר"ה)

[5]

אור החיים שמות פרק לא

 דוקא לעשות פירוש באדם שישנו בגדר עמוד לעשות אבל מי שודאי לא יקום ולא יגיע לשבת לשומרו הגם שרפואות אלו יועילו לשעות או לימים לא יחלל עליו שבת:

[6] Yoma 85a.

[7] In Halacha, chayei sha'ah can be defined asas someone who has anywhere from a few minutes to up to a year left to live.

[8]

מאירי יומא פה.

אף על פי שנתברר שאי אפשר לו לחיות אפי' שעה אחת שבאותה שעה יבוש בלבו ויתודה.

[9]

ביאור הלכה סימן שכט סעיף ד (ד"ה - אלא לפי)

אלא לפי שעה -….כמו שכתב המאירי ביומא וז"ל ואעפ"י שנתברר שאי אפשר לו לחיות אפילו שעה אחת שבאותה שעה ישוב בלבו ויתודה עכ"ל אמנם באמת נראה דכל זה הוא לטעמא בעלמא אבל לדינא לא תלוי כלל במצות דאין הטעם דדחינן מצוה אחת בשביל הרבה מצות אלא דחינן כל המצות בשביל חיים של ישראל וכדיליף לה שמואל מוחי בהם כדכתב הרמב"ם פ"ב מהלכות שבת שאין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם אלא רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם

[10] פרדס יוסף שמות לא:טז

[11] One could have also suggested that in the view of the Mei’ri, the mitzvah of teshuva and viduy is so fundamental and important that its fulfilment alone is valuable enough to warrant the overriding of Shabbos – as it will enable this person to fulfill this essential mitzvah while he still has a few moments left in this world.

[12]

תוספת יום הכיפורים מסכת יומא דף פה עמוד ב

כדי לשמור שבתות הרבה והלא אפי' לחיי שעה חיישינן ומחללין עליו את השבת כדלעיל י"ל שישמור שבתות הרבה לאו דוקא אלא ר"ל ציוויים הרבה דה' צונו ובחיי שעה דאדם הוא חי עושה כמה מצות והם הנקראים שבתות הרבה ודוק

[13]

ביאור הלכה סימן שכט סעיף ד ד"ה * אלא לפי

אלא לפי שעה - ואף על גב דלא שייך הכא הטעם חלל שבת אחת כדי שישמור שבתות הרבה משום דלאו דוקא שבת ה"ה שאר מצות כמו שכתב המאירי ביומא וז"ל ואעפ"י שנתברר שאי אפשר לו לחיות אפילו שעה אחת שבאותה שעה ישוב בלבו ויתודה עכ"ל אמנם באמת נראה דכל זה הוא לטעמא בעלמא אבל לדינא לא תלוי כלל במצות דאין הטעם דדחינן מצוה אחת בשביל הרבה מצות אלא דחינן כל המצות בשביל חיים של ישראל וכדיליף לה שמואל מוחי בהם כדכתב הרמב"ם פ"ב מהלכות שבת שאין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם אלא רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם

[14] While the Biur Halacha rejects this understanding of the Mei'ri l'maskana, this is only because he thinks that the Mei'ri must of hold of V’Chai Bahem, and thus we cannot have any external requirements for pikuach nefesh on Shabbos – as V’Chai Bahem is based solely on the inherent value of life.